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Abstract
A growing number of developed countries are offering entrepreneurial visas as a means of
attracting entrepreneurial talent and capital. In this paper we use a simple two sector model of
international trade with heterogeneous agents and financial frictions to show that
entrepreneurial migration can contribute to the international efficiency of production, even
when capital also flows internationally through borrowing and lending and foreign direct
investment. In our model all cross-border transactions are motivated by cross-country
variations in the quality of financial institutions.
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21. Introduction
The economic contributions of migrant entrepreneurs are increasingly being recognised as
evidenced by the recent attempts of many national governments to attract them. Table 1
provides a sample of visa programmes specifically targeting entrepreneurial migrants.1 In
addition, many European countries, including France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain,
Denmark, and Sweden, offer self-employed immigrant visas with conditions and eligibility
criteria that vary by country. Entrepreneurial migrants are generally expected to play an active
role in managing their enterprise and the requirements for permanent residency often include
job creation. The underlying motivation is that governments want to boost entrepreneurship in
general, because (successful) entrepreneurship is expected to create jobs and to bring other
economic benefits (innovation for example, see Xu, 2015). The argument for specific
entrepreneurial visas, is that standard work visas, which are otherwise used to attract skilled
and talented individuals, might exclude potential entrepreneurs. Work visas typically involve
education and skill qualifications which may not be necessary for successful entrepreneurship
in some areas, and often require employer sponsorship which constrains immigrants from
starting their own businesses until permanent residency has been achieved. In the meantime
the business opportunity and/or the potential migrant may have gone elsewhere (see Sumption,
2012).
Although, the numbers entering on entrepreneurial migrant visas are not large2 there is
ample evidence suggesting that a significant number of migrants establish their own firms. A
recent report (OECD, 2010) notes that in the majority of OECD countries the share of workers
in self-employment is higher among immigrants than among the native born. A more recent
study (Marchand and Siegel, 2014) finds that the corresponding shares for members of the
European Union are slightly higher for citizens (12.2%) than it is for non-citizens (10.5%).
However, there is significant variation in the likelihood of being self-employed across countries
for both types of residents. In the extremes we have Greece where 24.4 per cent of citizens are
self-employed in contrast to only 6.5 per cent of non-citizens and the Czech Republic where
27.8 per cent of non-citizens are self-employment in contrast to 15.1 per cent of citizens.
Migration experts have observed that despite the growing trend of entrepreneurial
migration there is lack of research on its potential effects (see e.g. Kerr, 2013; Marchand and
1 This list does not even exhaust the business/entrepreneurial visas available from these countries. Australia, for
example, also has: Investor, Significant Investor, Venture Capital Entrepreneur and Significant Business History
visa streams.
2 For example the Australian scheme listed in Table 1 had 739 applications lodged and 342 granted in 2013/1014;
and the UK Entrepreneur visa scheme granted 1156 visas in 2013-14.
3Siegel, 2014). All countries mentioned above are well-integrated into the world economy.
Goods, capital and firms are allowed to move relatively freely across their borders. If we view
entrepreneurial migration as providing a new channel for capital movements in addition to
international borrowing and lending and foreign direct investment (FDI), the question arises of:
what are the additional benefits of entrepreneurial migration for such economies? Or, put
differently, what are the additional gains from trade due to entrepreneurial migration?3
Drawing a distinction between entrepreneurial migration and FDI provides us with
several options, since both involve an entrepreneur from one country producing in the other,
and we base our distinction on the existence (FDI) or absence (entrepreneurial migration) of
retained links with the source country. Conventionally, FDI occurs when a ‘firm’ located in
one country owns and controls production in another. Thus in our model FDI occurs when an
agent who is an eligible entrepreneur in her domestic country, chooses to produce in the other
country, conditional on being an eligible entrepreneur there also, while retaining a production
link with her domestic country. The production link can be either the use of the source county
technology in production in the host market or the borrowing of capital from the source market
and subject to its financial institutions. We assume that the investing firm has full access to the
host property rights protection, and that the foreign investor’s income is transferred to and spent
in the source country. Entrepreneurial migration is then the migration of an agent (along with
her assets), to act as an entrepreneur in the other country. The entrepreneurial migrant
effectively severs all economic ties with the source country - capital is borrowed in the host;
the investment is subject to the host financial system and property rights; and the entrepreneur’s
income is spent in the host. In summary, in our model FDI gives entrepreneurs access to
property rights protection in the host country while retaining access to source country finance.
Migration puts entrepreneurs under the host country property rights and financial regimes.
A well-established literature has identified the quality of financial institutions as an
important determinant of trade patterns and the direction of the flows of capital and FDI.4 This
is because the capacity of a country’s institutions to mitigate the effects of market frictions
(such as informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers, poor quality corporate
3 We recognise that in practice governments might have a variety of motives for encouraging entrepreneurial
migration that are not captured by our model, such as attracting talent, creating new jobs, boosting economic
growth and broadening the tax base. Our aim is not to explain why governments offer entrepreneurial visas per
se, but to explore why there is even scope for entrepreneurial migration in countries that are already well integrated
into the world economy.
4 For evidence on the impact of the quality of financial institutions, see, for example, Beck (2002) and Manova
(2013) for trade patterns, Alfaro et al. (2008) for capital flows and Antras et al. (2009) for FDI. Property rights
protection also depends on the quality of the judicial institutions. Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) and Nunn (2007)
have examined their implications for international trade and FDI.
4governance and property rights) impacts on the ability of its entrepreneurs to borrow. In a
global economy cross-country differences in the quality of institutions act as a new source of
comparative advantage affecting the movements of goods, capital and firms across borders.
Building on this literature, we construct a very simple two factor, two-good model, in
which differences in the quality of financial institutions generate incentives for international
goods trade, international borrowing and lending, FDI and entrepreneurial migration to occur
simultaneously. Products are homogeneous, but economic agents are heterogeneous in their
capital ownership.5 We first introduce trade in goods, borrowing and lending and FDI. To keep
the analysis simple we do not model different types of transaction costs and policy barriers.6
Instead we ask “having allowed for trade, international borrowing and lending and FDI, is there
any scope for entrepreneurial migration?” and if so “how does it change the equilibrium?” 7
In our model the main incentive for entrepreneurs to migrate is access to better quality
financial institutions. We recognize that, as many experts have observed (see OECD (2010)
and Marchand and Siegel (2014)) that it is much more difficult for migrants to access financial
markets in the destination country than it is for native citizens. There is some evidence from
the United States, for example, that shows that controlling for credit-worthiness, ethnic
minorities are much more likely to be denied credit as other applicants and when they obtain
credit they do so at higher interest rates (Blanchflower et al., 2003; Blanchflower, 2009). But
these facts are also due to the higher failure rates of firms run by immigrants and also due to
the immigrants’ lack of credit histories in the country of residence (Bruder et al., 2011). We
will show that these observations are not inconsistent with our model.
But despite these difficulties many migrants manage to receive bank loans. For example,
Albareto and Mistrulli (2011) analyzing a large sample of Italian firms conclude that the gap
between the interest rates charged on loans granted to migrants and those on loans offered to
native citizens narrows significantly as credit history lengthens. In their study of German firms,
5 The same type of model has been used by Bougheas and Riezman (2007) to examine the effects of changes in
the distribution of human capital endowments on the patterns of trade and by Davidson and Matusz (2006) and
Davidson, Matusz and Nelson (2006) to examine compensation policies for those who lose with the introduction
of trade liberalization. In an earlier version of their work, Ju and Wei (2006) consider a modified two-sector,
Heckscher-Ohlin model which includes entrepreneurial heterogeneity in terms of their cost of exerting effort.
6 The advantage of not modeling transactions costs is that our analysis can be conducted in a relatively clear and
straightforward fashion. The drawback is that the equilibrium can be driven to corner solutions. Given that we are
assuming costless free trade in goods, there are no ‘market access’ advantages in locating production in any
particular market. This, combined with the free movement of capital and entrepreneurial labor means that all the
production of the capital intensive good can end up in one location.
7 Clearly our approach tends to minimise the potential role of entrepreneurial migration, since such migration is
only allowed to occur once the scope for financial capital flows and FDI have been exhausted, and migrants are
assumed to sever all links with the source country. Much of the FDI that occurs in our model could be replaced
by entrepreneurial migration if barriers to investment were relatively higher.
5Bruder et al. (2011) find that although it is significantly more difficult for migrants to obtain
credit (58% of the immigrants but only 39% of the native Germans were either denied a loan
or received a smaller amount than what they requested) still 26% of the ethnic-minorities’ start-
ups, where offered bank loans.
In Section 2, we model the potential inefficiencies introduced by institutional frictions
through the existence of two alternative technologies for producing the capital-intensive good.
The less efficient technology has constant returns to scale and does not require recourse to the
financial markets. The more efficient technology has a fixed scale, is risky and requires the
labor of an entrepreneur. Frictions limit the ability of entrepreneurs to raise funds in a
competitive financial market. In modelling financial constraints we use the fixed investment
version of the Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) model. The ability of agents to choose their level
of effort, which is unobservable by investors, limits the amount of income that the former can
pledge to the latter and thus the amount of external funds that they can obtain. Agents are free
to choose their sector of employment, a decision that ultimately depends on their initial
endowments of physical assets. Depending on the parameters of the model, we can have either
a partial specialization equilibrium, where both technologies are used and thus only a fraction
of agents specialize, or a complete specialization equilibrium where all agents produce only
one good. Under the former equilibrium the economy is financially constrained as there are
insufficient agents who satisfy the personal wealth constraint necessary to become active
entrepreneurs to ensure that all the economy’s capital stock is employed efficiently. In contrast,
under complete specialization what limits the production of the capital-intensive good is the
level of aggregate wealth.8
Given that we want to understand how differences in the quality of financial institutions
can affect entrepreneurial migration, we consider two countries with identical technologies and
endowments but which differ in the quality of their financial institutions. We start from an
autarky equilibrium in which one country is fully specialized and the other country is partially
specialized. In Section 3 we then investigate the effects of international trade, international
capital mobility and FDI. Then, in Section 4, we introduce entrepreneurial migration.
In accordance with the rest of the literature we demonstrate that better institutions
encourage the export of goods produced by financially dependent sectors (in our case, the
8 Similar equilibria are also derived in Ju and Wei (2011). In their work when financial constraints do not bind
comparative advantage is determined by technological factors, while when these constraints bind the quality of
institutions matter for comparative advantage.
6capital-intensive sector). 9 There is also empirical support for the assertion that financial
constraints have an influence on trade patterns.10 International borrowing and lending involves
asset holders in one country lending (the use of) their capital to entrepreneurs in the other. 11
Capital will flow away from the country with the poor quality of financial institutions till
interest rates in the two countries are equalized. We also find that FDI flows to countries with
higher quality institutions that offer better protection of property rights. A similar result is
obtained by Antras et al. (2009).12 These results are in contrast to those obtained by Ju and Wei
(2006, 2010) who examine the implications of cross country differences in the quality of
financial institutions for international capital flows. Their major result is to show that financial
globalization allows an inefficient financial system and weak corporate governance to be
bypassed by a combination of inward foreign direct investment and outward financial capital
flows. Thus, in their model FDI and capital flows move in opposite directions while in the
present paper they move in the same direction. The reason for the difference in the predictions
is that in our model, as in Antras et al. (2009), FDI is attracted by better property rights
protection while in Ju and Wei (2010, 2011) it is attracted by higher capital productivity. Given
that both motivations are likely to be present in practice, it is perhaps not surprising that the
empirical evidence on this is mixed. Antras et al. (2009) provide empirical support for their
model, while Forbes (2010) and Prasad et al. (2006) provide evidence supporting Ju and Wei
(2010, 2011). In particular, Antras et al. (2009) find that weaker investor protection rights
decrease the presence of multinational activity and make the remaining multinational firms
more reliant financially on their parent companies. Similar conclusions are reached by
Aleksynska and Havrylchyk (2013) who compare the impact of institutional quality on FDI
investors from the North and the South.13
9 An observation made by Antras and Caballero (2009), Beck (2002), Chaney (2005), Egger and Keuschnigg
(2009), Foellmi and Oechslin (2010), Furusawa and Yanagawa (2011), Ju and Wei (2011), Kletzer and Bardhan
(1987), Manova (2013), Matsuyama (2005) and Wynne (2005).
10 Manova (2008) finds that financial liberalization increases exports disproportionately more in sectors that are
financially vulnerable. Similarly, Manova (2013) finds that financially developed countries export a wider variety
of products in financially vulnerable sectors. Similar conclusions are in Beck (2003), Hur, Raj and Riyanto (2006)
and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2006).
11To keep the analysis simple, we have opted for a static framework (see also Ju and Wei, 2011). The main
advantage of a dynamic analysis is that it allows a distinction between financial capital and physical capital.
However, Antras and Caballero (2009), by developing a dynamic version of their main static model have shown
that the two approaches yield similar predictions.
12 Antras et al. (2009) distinguish between multinational firm activity and FDI. The former is similar to the
definition of FDI in our model. They make the distinction because they allow for co-ownership of projects and
thus they want to separate the level of investment financed internally from the level of foreign ownership.
13 They state “We confirm earlier findings in the literature for investors from the North by showing that they are
consistently deterred by a larger institutional difference between FDI source and destination countries. … Those
investors from the South that invest in countries with better institutions choose countries with the best possible
institutions, thus giving preference to larger positive institutional distance. Despite unfamiliarity, such an
7As we will see below, in our model, entrepreneurial migration flows in the same
direction as FDI. It seems that our choice of modelling FDI leaves less room for entrepreneurial
migration given that both are driven by similar factors. Thus, if such migration is a feature of
the equilibrium in our model it is plausible that it would also be featured in a model with the
alternative specification of FDI.
We complete the model by introducing entrepreneurial migration in Section 4. The
difference in quality of institutions between the two countries creates a wedge between the
thresholds that separate those agents that become entrepreneurs from those agents that produce
the labor-intensive good. Clearly, the threshold is lower in the country with the better quality
institutions and this offers incentives to those agents in the other country with endowments
between the two thresholds to migrate. We show that entrepreneurial migration survives in an
equilibrium where all forms of capital movements are allowed and find that at the new
equilibrium FDI and migration are weak substitutes.
Our approach has parallels with Schmitt and Soubeyran (2006) who employ a one-
sector model to explain two-way flows of highly skilled migrants – referred to as ‘brain
circulation’. In their model production requires the services of an entrepreneur and workers
and, as in our model, the choice between these two occupations is endogenously determined.
Migrants can be workers or entrepreneurs and their equilibrium depends on cross-country
technological differences. Like us, Schmitt and Soubeyran (2006) find that some agents switch
activities when migration is allowed. However, while their focus is exclusively on migration
generated by technology differences, our focus is on cross-country differences in the quality of
financial institutions that determine not only entrepreneurial returns but also the ability to
become an entrepreneur.
Section 5 concludes.
2. The Closed-Economy Model
There is a continuum of agents of measure 1 each endowed with one unit of labor. The only
source of heterogeneity among them is their endowments of assets (capital) ܣ which are
uniformly distributed on the unit interval. 14 The economy produces two final goods - a
institutional environment is the most transparent for potential entrants due to low corruption, sound property rights,
and political stability.” (p.39)
14 Alternatively, we could have considered financial frictions in a model where heterogeneity arises because of
differences in productivity (see, for example, Buera et al., 2011, Moll, 2014). In a static framework this choice is
not consequential.
8manufacturing product (MAN) and a primary commodity (PRI). All agents are risk-neutral,
have homothetic preferences and allocate equal shares of their income on each good.
Production of one unit of PRI requires one unit of labor. There are two technologies
available for producing MAN. The first, the safe technology, is a constant returns technology
that requires one unit of assets for each unit of production. The second, the advanced
technology, is stochastic and needs an entrepreneur who uses her labor endowment to manage
it. The advanced technology requires a fixed investment of ܭ > 1 units of capital and yields
ܴ units of MAN when it succeeds and 0 when it fails.15 Following the Holmström and Tirole
(1997) model we assume that the probability of success depends on the behavior of the
entrepreneur. When the entrepreneur exerts effort the probability of success is ݌ு = ߣ, while
when she shirks the probability of success is ݌௅ = 0; however, in the latter case she derives an
additional benefit ܤ.16 We assume that when the entrepreneur exerts effort net benefits are
positive (ܴߣ > ܭ ), and negative otherwise (ܤ < ܭ ). Put differently, projects are socially
efficient only in the case where the entrepreneur exerts effort. We follow Ju and Wei (2006,
2010) and interpret a higher value of ߣas better property rights protection (or a lower risk of
expropriation or a lower tax on output); and a higher ܤ as weaker corporate governance.
In this economy agents have the following three choices. Firstly, they can use their
labor to produce one unit of PRI and invest their assets in the safe technology. Secondly, they
can use their labor to produce one unit of PRI and lend their assets to entrepreneurs. Thirdly,
they can become entrepreneurs and borrow additional assets from lenders.
2.1. The Financial Contract
The derivation of the financial contract is based on the fixed-investment case in Holmström
and Tirole (1997). The financial market is competitive and lenders make zero profits. Under
the assumption that borrowers are protected by limited liability, the financial contract specifies
that the two parties receive nothing when the project fails. Let ܴ௕ denote the entrepreneur’s
payoff otherwise. Then an entrepreneur will exert effort if the incentive compatibility constraint
15 So PRI is labor-intensive and MAN is capital-intensive. Taking the limiting cases on factor inputs greatly
simplifies the determination of factor prices and our results are consistent with those obtained when both sectors
use both factors. See Egger and Keuschnigg (2009) and Wynne (2005) for example. The restriction of constant
marginal productivity of capital is of no great consequence given our static environment. For some important
dynamic effects see von Hagen and Zhang (2014).
16This is how Tirole (2006) interprets B: “The entrepreneur can “behave” (“work”, “exert effort”, “take no private
benefit”) or “misbehave” (“shirk”, “take a private benefit”); or equivalently, the entrepreneur chooses between a
project with a high probability of success and another project which ceteris paribus she prefers (is easier to
implement, is more fun, has greater spinoffs in the future for the entrepreneur, benefits a friend, delivers perks, is
more “glamorous,” etc.) but has a lower probability of success.” (p. 115)
9ܴߣ ௕ ≥ ܤ
is satisfied. This constraint sets a minimum on the entrepreneur’s payoff which is the measure
of agency costs. For a given contract the entrepreneur has a higher incentive to exert effort the
larger the probability of success (ߣ) and the lower the benefit from shirking (B). The constraint
also implies that the maximum (expected) amount that the entrepreneur can pledge to the lender
is (ܴߣ − ܤ). Consider an entrepreneur with initial wealth ܣ. Then the lender’s zero-profit
condition for a loan to this entrepreneur, under the assumption that the borrower has an
incentive to exert effort, is given by
ߣ(ܴ − ܴ௕) = ݎ(ܭ − ܣ)
where ݎdenotes the equilibrium interest rate. The left-hand side is equal to the expected return
of the lender and the right-hand side is equal to the opportunity cost of the loan.
2.2. Financial Market Equilibrium
Substituting the incentive compatibility constraint as an equality in the zero-profit condition
gives a threshold on physical assets (ܣ଴) that entrepreneurs must be endowed with in order to
obtain external finance and thus take advantage of the high-return advanced technology – i.e.
ܣ଴ = ܭ − ଵ௥(ܴߣ − ܤ) = ܭ − ఊ௥ (1)
Where ߛ≡ ܴߣ − ܤ, is equal to the maximum pledge that entrepreneurs can make to lenders.
The number of active entrepreneurs/projects/firms in an economy is then determined by either
the number of eligible entrepreneurs (the ‘financing constraint’) or the total assets available
for borrowing (the ‘wealth constraint’). Each constraint generates an associated entrepreneurial
(asset) threshold. Given that agents always have the option to invest their assets in the safe
technology, the equilibrium interest rate must satisfy ݎ≥ 1. The entrepreneurial threshold
under the financing constraint (ܣ௙), is derived by setting ݎ= 1 in (1) as
ܣ௙ = ܭ − ߛ (2)
This threshold depends on the investment technology and the quality of the country’s financial
institutions through the maximum pledge. Given the investment size ܭ and the total assets
available ∫ ܣ݀ܣ
ଵ
଴
= ଵ
ଶ
(the economy’s wealth), the number (mass) of active entrepreneurs when
all assets are invested in the risky technology is ଵ
ଶ௄
. The entrepreneurial threshold under the
wealth constraint (ܣ௪ ) then satisfies
10
1 − ܣ௪ = ଵଶ௄
where 1 − ܣ௪ is the mass of agents with asset holdings greater than or equal to ܣ௪ . Rewriting
this equation as (1 − ܣ௪ )ܭ = ଵଶ we obtain the market-clearing equilibrium condition where the left-
hand side now shows the total demand for funds by eligible entrepreneurs. Solving for the threshold
we get
ܣ௪ = 1 −
ଵ
ଶ௄
≡ ߜ (3)
This threshold depends on the country’s average asset holdings. Using (3) and (1) we can solve
for the equilibrium interest rate when the wealth constraint is binding:
ݎ= ఊ
௄ିଵା
భ
మ಼
= ఊ
௄ିఋ
(4)
We can now define the two types of equilibria that can occur in this model:
Definition 1 - Complete Occupational Specialization Equilibrium (COSE): An equilibrium
where the wealth constraint is binding and the equilibrium interest rate adjusts so that
ܣ଴ = ܣ௪ > ܣ௙ with ݎ= ఊ௄ିఋ ≥ 1.
When the economy is in a COSE, all producers of the primary commodity invest their assets
in the financial market. Only entrepreneurs produce the manufacturing product. Here the
imperfections in the capital market do not affect the allocation efficiency of the economy as all
capital is invested in the advanced technology.
Definition 2 - Partial Occupational Specialization Equilibrium (POSE): In this case ఊ
௄ିఋ
< 1,
the financing constraint is binding and ܣ଴ = ܣ௙ > ܣ௪ , with ݎ= 1.
Now financial imperfections do affect allocation efficiency and some assets are invested in the
safe technology.
2.3. Goods Market Equilibrium
Without any loss of generality we use MAN as the numeraire and let ܲ be the relative price of
PRI. We denote the output of PRI by x, and the output of MAN by y. Then
ݔ= ܣ଴ and ݕ= [1 − ܣ଴]ܴߣ + ቄଵଶ− [1 − ܣ଴]ܭቅ (5)
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PRI output depends on the number of agents working in the PRI sector, while MAN output can
have two components – the output produced using the advanced technology plus any output
produced using the safe technology (if the country is in a POSE). The value of PRI output is
ܲݔ= ܲܣ଴, and aggregate income is given by ௥ଶ+ [ܴߣ − ݎܭ][1 − ܣ଴] + ܲܣ଴, where the first
term is equal to total interest income and ܴߣ − ݎܭ is the payment for entrepreneurship, and is
the same for all active entrepreneurs. Since half of income is spent on PRI, we can use (5) to
solve for
ܲ = ೝమା(ఒோି௥௄)[ଵି஺బ]
஺బ
= ௬
௫
(6)
In a COSE, (6) simplifies to
௪ܲ = ܴߣ ଵଶ௄ିଵ (7)
When the economy is not financially constrained, the relative price depends only on technology.
However in a POSE (r = 1), (6) becomes
௙ܲ = భమା(ఒோି௄) ଵൣି஺೑൧஺೑ = భమା(ఒோି௄)[ଵି(௄ିఊ)]௄ିఊ (8)
If the financial constraint is binding, the relative price now depends also on the wealth
distribution and the level of agency costs.
With regard to agent’s incomes, an agent with asset holdings below the threshold works in the
PRI sector and lends her capital, generating total (numeraire) earnings of ܲ+ ݎܣ, which is
increasing in both P (the ‘wage’) and the interest rate. An agent with sufficient assets to be an
active entrepreneur earns ܴߣ − ݎ[ܭ − ܣ], which is decreasing in r and is unaffected by P.
Comparing these we see that the ‘rent’ from the entrepreneurial option is ܴߣ − ݎܭ − ܲ, which
is the same for all entrepreneurs and is decreasing in both the interest and wage rates.
3. Trade, Capital Mobility and FDI (TCF)
We now consider international trade flows, international borrowing and lending and FDI
between two such economies. We deal with these transactions simultaneously because their
effects are familiar from the literature. The resulting equilibrium will provide a base from
which we can add entrepreneurial migration. We assume the two countries have the same
distributions of wealth and population, but that the home country has superior institutions –
stronger property rights (ߣ> ߣ∗) and better corporate governance (ܤ∗ > ܤ), where foreign
country variables and parameters are denoted by *. We start from an autarky equilibrium where
12
one country is financially constrained and the other is not.17 Given that the distribution of asset
holdings is assumed to be the same in the two countries, the home country has more eligible
entrepreneurs at any common interest rate (see (12) below), so that if only one country is
financially constrained it must be the foreign country. Then from (2)
ܣ௙ = ܭ − ߛ< ܣ௙∗ = ܭ − ߛ∗ and ܣ௪ = ܣ௪∗ = ߜ (9)
An autarky equilibrium where the foreign country has a POSE and the home country a COSE
is possible as long as
1 − ܣ௙ > ଵଶ௄ > 1 − ܣ௙∗ or ߛ> ܭ − ߜ> ߛ∗ (10)
The first inequality implies the home country has a ‘surplus’ of eligible entrepreneurs when its
interest rate is unity, and hence the home country’s equilibrium interest rate under autarky
exceeds the lower bound (ݎ௔ > 1 ) to ration the investment opportunities. 18 The second
inequality implies that the foreign country has a ‘shortage’ of eligible entrepreneurs even when
its interest rate is at its lower bound (ݎ௔∗ = 1). We illustrate the possible autarky outcomes in
Figure 1. Since we assume ߛ> ߛ∗, the relevant range is under the 45o line, and can be divided
into three areas. When both pledges are low (both < ܭ − ߜ), both countries are in a POSE;
when both pledges are high (both > ܭ − ߜ), both countries are in a COSE, and in the
intermediate ranges (ߛ> ܭ − ߜ> ߛ∗) the home country has a COSE and the foreign a POSE.
Given K and the distribution of wealth, ܭ − ߜ(= ܭ − ܣ௪ ) measures the minimum
pledge necessary for there to be sufficient eligible entrepreneurs to employ all the available
capital under the advanced technology. From (4) we get
ݎ௔ = ఊ௄ିఋ > ݎ௔∗ = 1 (11)
where to the right of the first equality sign we have the ratio of the maximum to the minimum
pledge.
International trade will equalise relative product prices (at ௜ܲ, say) and international
capital movements will equalise interest rates (at ݎ௜, say). Since trade alone does not affect
17 Given that our objective is to understand how differences in the quality of institutions affect the flows of
entrepreneurial migration, the case where one country is wealth constrained while the other is financially
constrained is of most interest. When both countries are wealth constrained the role of financial institutions is
minimal. When both countries are financially constrained their interest rates under autarky are equal, and while
the analysis for that case yields some interesting results when economic integration alters the type of equilibrium
in one country,, the comparative statics are similar to those derived above.
18Note that ‘a’ is a mnemonic for ‘autarky’. Later ‘i’ will indicate integration (TCF) and ‘e’ integration plus
entrepreneurial migration.
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interest rates in this model, 19 once international borrowing and lending are possible capital will
flow from the foreign to the home country until both interest rates are equalised at ݎ௜≥ 1, with
the inequality holding if the capital outflow releases the foreign country from its financial
constraint before the home interest rate has fallen to unity.
FDI occurs when an eligible entrepreneur (‘firm’) in one country produces in the other
country, but continues to use the source country technology or to borrow in the source country,
and where the entrepreneurial income is repatriated to the source country. Home firms will not
find FDI attractive because of the foreign country’s weaker property rights regime and the fact
that interest rates are equalised by capital mobility. But foreign entrepreneurs will perceive FDI
as attractive as it gives them access to the stronger home property rights regime. 20 The
opportunity for foreign firms to access the superior home regime through FDI, while continuing
to borrow in the foreign (source) market, increases their maximum pledge from ߛ∗ to ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ
(where ∆ߣ= ߣ− ߣ∗ ) and this in itself reduces the foreign entrepreneurial threshold. 21
Although these firms all produce in the home country, they use resources exclusively from
their source market, and hence have no direct effect on the home capital market.
Foreign agents eligible to borrow in the foreign country, undertake FDI and produce in
the home country using the home technology as long as ܣ ≥ ܭ − ଵ
௥೔
[ܴߣ − ܤ∗]. Since ܭ −
ଵ
௥೔
[ߣ∗ܴ − ܤ∗] > ܭ − ଵ
௥೔
[ܴߣ − ܤ∗], all foreign firms that would have been active in the absence
of FDI are eligible to invest abroad. Let ܮ௜∗ denote the total lending by the foreign country to
home firms. The thresholds (ܣ௜,ܣ௜∗) and interest rate (ݎ௜) must now satisfy:
ܣ௜= ܭ − ఊ௥೔ and ܣ௜∗ = ܭ − ఊ∗ା∆ఒ௥೔ (12)
1 − ܣ௜= ଵଶ௄ + ௅೔∗௄ and 1 − ܣ௜∗ ≤ ଵଶ௄ − ௅೔∗௄ (13)
19 Because the marginal product of capital is constant. In models where trade affects the marginal product of
capital, as for example in Furusawa and Yanagawa (2011), the interest rate will increase in the country with the
higher quality financial institutions and decline in the other country thus reinforcing the results of this model.
20 Our supposition that foreign firms can take full advantage of the property rights in the home country is extreme
but without any consequence for our qualitative results. Aizenman and Spiegel (2006) consider the implications
for FDI and trade when firms investing abroad cannot take full advantage of the property rights in the host country.
21 The key requirement here is what it means to be ‘an eligible entrepreneur in the source county’. If the source
market views the eligibility of the agent using both source property rights and source corporate governance, then
FDI would leave thresholds in both countries unaffected. This case would leave maximum scope for
entrepreneurial migration. But given that the FDI firm’s output will be subject to the host country property rights
regime, we have opted to allow it and the source corporate governance to determine source country eligibility for
an entrepreneur undertaking FDI. Thresholds are then affected by FDI. Alternatively we could allow source
eligibility to be determined by both host property rights and host corporate governance, leaving minimum scope
(i.e. none) for entrepreneurial migration.
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with the inequality in (13) holding if the equalised interest rate is unity.
From (12) we see that at the common interest rate we have
ܣ௜
∗ − ܣ௜= ଵ௥೔{ߛ− ߛ∗ − ∆ߣ} > 0 (14)
that is the home country has the lower threshold because of its more efficient institutions (its
higher pledge).
3.1. TCF-POSE Equilibrium
In this case, economic integration is not sufficient to relax the financing constraint and thus
remove the shortage of foreign entrepreneurs. Setting ݎ௜= 1 in (12) and (13) we get:
ܣ௜= ܭ − ߛ and ܣ௜∗ = ܭ − [ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ] (15)[ܭ − ߜ] + ௅೔∗
௄
= ߛ and [ܭ − ߜ] − ௅೔∗
௄
≥ ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ (16)
This TCF-POSE equilibrium holds if ଵ
௄
≥ [ܭ − ܣ௜] + [ܭ − ܣ௜∗], i.e. there are insufficient
eligible entrepreneurs in both countries combined to employ all the capital under the advanced
technology, even when the equalised interest rate is unity. Using (16) the condition can be
written as 2[ܭ − ߜ] ≥ ߛ+ ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ= 2ߛ− ∆ܤ, where ∆ܤ = ܤ∗ − ܤ > 0.
We assume that the interest income on foreign loans and income earned from FDI is
remitted in units of MAN the output that the capital/FDI produces. The home country will
experience an inflow of capital and large outflows of MAN output on service account.- Once
we take this repatriated income into account, it is the home income share rather than its output
share that determines the direction of trade in goods. The home country will also be a net
exporter of MAN and an importer of PRI output (see Appendix A1).
3.2. TCF-COSE Equilibrium
When as a result economic integration the financing constraint is not binding anymore we have
a TCF-COSE with ݎ௜> 1. Our solutions become
ܣ௜= ߜ− ௅೔∗௄ and ܣ௜∗ = ߜ+ ௅೔∗௄ (17)
௅೔
∗
௄
= ∆஻
ఊାఊ∗ା∆ఒ
[ܭ − ߜ] and ݎ௜= ఊାఊ∗ା∆ఒଶ[௄ିఋ] > 1 (18)[ܭ − ߜ] + ௅೔∗
௄
= ఊ
௥೔
< ߛand [ܭ − ߜ] − ௅೔∗
௄
= ఊ∗ା∆ఒ
௥೔
(19)
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In this case FDI and international capital movements are partial substitutes. Now all MAN
output is produced using the advanced technology. Still, the patterns of capital flows, FDI flows
and trade flows (see Appendix A2) are the same as before.
3.3. Institutions and Globalization
Our model predicts that FDI is a substitute for trade. The prediction is not new, however, the
explanation is. There is a large literature analysing the relationship between FDI and
international trade that suggests that horizontal FDI is a substitute for trade while vertical FDI
is a complement (Blonigen, 2001). However, FDI and trade in that literature are driven by
technology and endowment differences between countries and are influenced by trade costs
and barriers that are absent here. In our model FDI and trade are driven by differences in the
quality of financial institutions. In particular, FDI is horizontal but here the (foreign) firms
engaged in this activity belong to the importing sector. The substitution effect in our model is
driven by the repatriated income generated by FDI firms.
As we discussed in the introduction the fact that in our model FDI and capital flows are
determined by the quality of institutions also accounts for the prediction that both move in the
same direction, as in Antras et al. (2009), while in Ju and Wei (2006, 2010), where they are
driven by technological differences, they move in opposite directions. However, there is also
an important difference between our work and Antras et al. (2009). Their model accounts for
the large FDI inflows in developing countries. In particular, they show that FDI provides a
means for avoiding the host country’s poor financial development. In our model, the only
difference between countries lies in the qualities of their financial institutions. Among
otherwise similar countries, FDI is attracted to destinations with better functioning financial
markets. This is consistent with the empirical evidence provided by Alfaro et al. (2004).
4. Entrepreneurial Migration in a Globalized World (TCFE)
We now allow entrepreneurial migration. Given that in any equilibrium relative prices and
interest rates are equalized and given that the home country has better protection of property
rights all those entrepreneurs who are eligible to undertake FDI are indifferent between FDI
and migrating. To break this deadlock we assume that, other things equal, agents have a
preference for residing in their country of origin. Foreign agents with asset holdings in the
range (ܣ௜∗,ܣ௜), who are not eligible entrepreneurs in their domestic market and who cannot
therefore become firms and undertake FDI, will have an incentive to migrate to the home
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country where their asset holdings do allow them to become entrepreneurs. 22 Adding
entrepreneurial migration leads to all agents with asset holdings above the minimum of the two
entrepreneurial thresholds becoming entrepreneurs somewhere. In equilibrium all foreign
agents in the range (ܣ௘∗ ,ܣ௘) migrate to become entrepreneurs in the home country.23 The
thresholds for the two financial systems are:
ܣ௘ = ܭ − ఊ௥೐ and ܣ௘∗ = ܭ − ఊ∗ା∆ఒ௥೐ where ܣ௘∗ − ܣ௘ = ∆஻௥೐ (20)
Let ௘݊∗ denote the number of foreign entrepreneurs that migrate. Then
௘݊
∗ = ܣ௘∗ − ܣ௘ = ∆஻௥೐ (21)
The following result describes the impact of entrepreneurial migration on the global financial
market equilibrium:
Proposition 1: In the post-migration equilibrium both countries are in a COSE.
Proof: The total wealth of the migrants is given by ∫ ܣ݀ܣ஺೐
∗
஺೐
= ൛[஺೐∗ ]మି[஺೐]మൟ
ଶ
= ∆஻
௥೐
ቄ
஺೐
∗ା஺೐
ଶ
ቅ. Their
average wealth is ቄ஺೐
∗ା஺೐
ଶ
ቅ= ܣ௘ + ∆஻ଶ௥೐ , and their average borrowing is therefore ௘݈∗ = ܭ −
ቂܣ௘ + ∆஻ଶ௥೐ቃ. Using ܮ௘∗ to denote any international lending by the foreign country, we can write
the capital market equilibrium conditions in the two countries as[1 − ܣ௘] + ௘݊∗ = ଵଶ௄ + ௅೐∗ା௡೐∗[௄ି௟೐∗]௄ and [1 − ܣ௘∗ ] ≤ ଵଶ௄ − ௅೐∗ା௡೐∗[௄ି௟೐∗]௄
Substituting ௘݊∗ from (21), and letting ܯ ∗ ≡ ܮ௘∗ − ௘݊∗ ௘݈∗ these equations simplify to[ܭ − ߜ] + ெ ∗
௄
= ఊ
௥೐
< ߛ (22)
[ܭ − ߜ] − ெ ∗
௄
≥
ఊ∗ା∆ఒା∆஻
௥೐
(23)
An equilibrium where both countries are in a POSE (i.e. ݎ௘ = 1) requires that2[ܭ − ߜ] ≥ ߛ+ ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ+ ∆ܤ = 2ߛ
22 These agents migrate to become entrepreneurs in the other country. This should be distinguished from the
phenomenon of credit constrained agents migrating temporarily in order to accumulate assets so that they satisfy
the asset threshold when they return to their home country. See, for example, Mensard (2004).
23 Notice that the average migrant is more financially constrained than the average native entrepreneur. To
simplify the exposition of the model we have ignored other financial market frictions that might be ameliorated
by higher levels internal funds, such as other types of moral hazard problems, adverse selection, etc. Such
considerations would introduce some uncertainty in funding and as immigrants are more financially constrained
they would be less likely to receive funding (Albareto and Mistrulli, 2011; Bruder et al., 2011)
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Which is inconsistent with our assumption that ߛ> ܭ − ߜ in the initial equilibrium. So for the
full range of pledges that we are considering both countries are in a COSE in the post-migration
equilibrium.          □ 
If the home institutional quality was sufficient to give it a COSE in autarky, then, given that
the two countries have the same wealth, access by the foreign firms and agents to the home
property rights through FDI and to the home corporate governance and financial markets
through entrepreneurial migration are sufficient to generate a COSE in the foreign country.
In order to appreciate the impact of entrepreneurial migration we need to consider two
cases depending on the type of equilibrium we have in its absence.
4.1. TCF-COSE and TCFE-COSE Equilibrium
We begin by considering the case when before entrepreneurial migration the global equilibrium
was COSE. Taking the equality in (23), we can solve for
ݎ௘ = ఊ௄ିఋ > ݎ௜> 1 (24)
ܣ௘ = ܭ − ఊ௥೐ = ߜ and ܣ௘∗ = ܣ௘ + ∆஻௥೐ = ߜ+ ∆஻ఊ [ܭ − ߜ] (25)
Substituting for ݎ௘ in (22) (or (23)) we find that in equilibrium
ெ ∗
௄
= 0; or ܮ௘∗ = ௘݊∗ ௘݈∗ . That is
the aggregate borrowing by foreign migrant entrepreneurs in the home market is equal to the
aggregate lending by the foreign country in the home market. It is as if the migrants brought
their full capital requirements with them. Recalling that foreign migrants do not meet the
entrepreneurial threshold in the foreign market (i.e. ܣ < ܣ௘∗ ), it must be the case that migrants
borrow more than foreign FDI firms and home firms on average.
The influx of entrepreneurial migrants has increased the entrepreneurial threshold in
the home country relative to the TCF-COSE (ܣ௘ > ܣ௜). Similarly, comparing (17) and (25),
we find that ܣ௘∗ > ܣ௜∗ so the number of foreign firms falls. Entrepreneurial migration reduces
FDI. But now ܣ௘∗ simply defines the border between foreign firms undertaking FDI and foreign
agents emigrating to become entrepreneurs. The effective foreign entrepreneurial threshold,
which will determine which agents work in the PRI sector, is ܣ௘, and ܣ௘ = ߜ< ܣ௜∗. So PRI
output increases in the home country and falls in the foreign country, relative to the TCF-COSE,
although aggregate PRI output is unchanged.
ݔ௘ = ܣ௘ = ݔ௘∗ = ߜ; ݔ௘ > ݔ௜; ݔ௘∗ < ݔ௜∗ and ܺ௘ = ܺ௜ (26)
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All MAN production takes place in the home country under the home property rights regime.
The MAN outputs are the same as in the TCF-COSE
ݕ௘ = ܴߣ ଵ௄ = ݕ௜ and ݕ௘∗ = 0 = ݕ௜∗ and ௘ܻ = ܴߣ ଵ௄ = ௜ܻ (27)
The equilibrium world relative price is unchanged since aggregate outputs are unchanged ௘ܲ =
௜ܲ
In summary, the output effects of introducing entrepreneurial migration are confined to a
transfer of PRI production to the home from the foreign country, and some rearrangement of
the agents undertaking MAN production. The influx of migrant entrepreneurs crowds out some
home entrepreneurs who now fall below the new common entrepreneurial threshold (those in
the range ܣ௜ to ܣ௘), and some foreign entrepreneurs who would have undertaken FDI in the
TCF-COSE now become migrants (those in the range ܣ௜∗ to ܣ௘∗ ).
The home country remains an exporter of MAN, because it has had an inflow of factors
specific to MAN output. While we have shown that entrepreneurial migration (partially)
substitutes for FDI, there are no clear substitutability or complementarity relationships between
entrepreneurial migration and goods trade or international borrowing and lending. Borrowing
by the home country, which is equal in value to the borrowing by its immigrant entrepreneurs,
may be greater or less than its borrowing in the TCF-COSE (see Appendix A3). Lastly, given
that aggregate outputs are unchanged, entrepreneurial migration has no impact on global
production efficiency in this case. But the increase in the interest rate has transferred income
from borrowers (entrepreneurs) to lenders. The migrants have gained access to the
entrepreneurial rent. The displaced host entrepreneurs have lost it.
4.2. TCF-POSE and TCFE-COSE Equilibrium
Where entrepreneurial migration will have an impact on aggregate outputs is for those cases
that generate a TCF-POSE but a TCFE-COSE - i.e. where 2ߛ> 2[ܭ − ߜ] > ߛ+ ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ.
Again the home threshold rises (ܣ௘− ܣ௜= ߛ− [ܭ − ߜ] > 0), the foreign threshold also rises
(ܣ௘∗ − ܣ௜∗ = [ߛ− ∆ܤ]ቄ1 − [௄ିఋ]ఊ ቅ> 0), and the number of agents working in the foreign PRI
sector falls (as ܣ௜∗ − ܣ௘ = [ܭ − ߜ] − [ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ] > 0 in this range). Home output of PRI rises
and foreign output of PRI falls. Home output of MAN rises and foreign output of MAN falls.
Using (9), (A9) and (27) it is straightforward to show that ௜ܻ< ௘ܻ and
ܺ௜− ܺ௘ = 2[ܭ − ߜ] − [ߛ+ ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ] > 0.
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in this range. We conclude that ௘ܲ > ௜ܲin this case. Once again there is no clear substitutability
or complementarity relationship between entrepreneurial migration and goods trade or
international borrowing and lending (see Appendix A4). However, now the switch of
equilibrium implies that there are efficiency gains in production as MAN is only produced with
the advanced technology. Both the wage and the interest rate increase, raising the (numeraire)
income of lenders, reducing the income of entrepreneurs and the entrepreneurial rent. Again
the new entrepreneurs gain access to the entrepreneurial rent at the expense of the displaced
entrepreneurs.
4.3. Institutions and Entrepreneurial Migration
In Section 3 we have shown that cross-country variations in property rights protection and in
the quality of corporate governance can be part of the explanation behind the flows of goods,
capital and FDI across national borders. By affecting the ability of entrepreneurs to raise funds
externally, such institutional variations prove to be sources of comparative advantage in
addition to those attributed to differences in endowments and technologies. In this section, we
have allowed for migration of entrepreneurs in a two-country world where goods, capital and
FDI can already move freely. The following proposition summarizes our results thus far
concerning the impact of entrepreneurial migration on the two countries.
Proposition 2: The introduction of entrepreneurial migration to a two-country world where
goods, capital and FDI already move freely across borders leads to:
(a) Agents in the country with the weaker institutions emigrating to become entrepreneurs;
(b) An increased mass of entrepreneurs from the source country. Entrepreneurial
migration crowds out some domestic entrepreneurs in the host.
(c) A higher world interest rate;
(d) A weakly higher world relative price of PRI;24
(e) Continued MAN exports by the migrant host, because the migrating factors are specific
to the MAN sector;
(f) A reduced number of firms undertaking FDI. Entrepreneurial migration is a substitute
for FDI.
Proof: See above and Appendices A3 and A4.      □ 
24 The qualifier ‘weakly’ is added because when the original equilibrium is COSE the relative price remains
unchanged.
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In their study Schmitt and Soubeyran (2006) analyse entrepreneurial migration in a model
where there is no role for international capital markets and FDI. According to Proposition 2
entrepreneurial migration not only survives the introduction of these aspects of globalization
but also it flows in the same direction as they do, namely, towards countries with higher quality
financial institutions.
In our analysis, we have assumed that the home country has superior financial
institutions, that is both better protection of property rights (ߣ> ߣ∗) and better corporate
governance (ܤ∗ > ܤ). In Proposition 3 below we isolate the impact of each of these two
parameters on entrepreneurial migration. While we still assume that the home country has
superior institutions we examine separately their marginal impact.
Proposition 3: (Institutions and Entrepreneurial Migration)
(a) An improvement in the host country’s property rights (increase in ߣ) will reduce
entrepreneurial migration;
(b) An improvement in the host country’s corporate governance (decrease in ܤ ) will
increase entrepreneurial migration;
(c) An improvement in the source country’s property rights (increase in ߣ∗) will have no
effect on entrepreneurial migration; and
(d) An improvement in the source country’s corporate governance (decrease in ܤ∗) will
reduce entrepreneurial migration.
Proof: Substituting (24) into (21), we obtain the expression for the number of migrant
entrepreneurs in terms of the financial institutional variables
௘݊
∗ = ܣ௘∗ − ܣ௘ = ∆஻௥೐ = ஻∗ି஻ఒோି஻ [ܭ − ߜ] (28)
Then (a), (c) and (d) follow from inspection of (28). For (b) we note that
݅ݏ݃݊ቀ
డ௡೐
∗
డ஻
ቁ= ݅ݏ݃ (݊−[ܴߣ − ܤ∗]) < 0 since ܴߣ > ߣ∗ܴ > ܤ∗.   □ 
In our model ߣand ߣ∗ capture the level of property rights protection accorded to firms
in the MAN sector in the two countries. Changes in these parameters impact on FDI as foreign
entrepreneurs take advantage of the better property rights protection regime in the home
country. Property rights in the home country have an indirect effect on entrepreneurial
migration through their impact on the world interest rate. In the new equilibrium the interest
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rate does not depend on the profitability of the MAN sector in Foreign as all production has
moved abroad.
In contrast changes in the quality of corporate governance (as captured by variations in
ܤ and ܤ∗) have a direct impact on entrepreneurial migration. The higher the difference in the
two parameters the higher is the mass of financially constrained agents in the foreign country
that can access the financial markets in the home country. For the home country a change in
the quality of corporate governance has also a counterbalancing effect due to its impact on the
interest rate, and this effect tends to dominate.
5. Concluding Comments
Our aim in this paper has been to investigate the effects of adding entrepreneurial migration to
a substantially globalized world economy. We introduced financial frictions into a simple two
sector economy and then considered the implications of allowing free trade of goods and
international borrowing and lending and foreign direct investment before introducing
entrepreneurial migration across international borders. Following the earlier literature, we find
that the quality of institutions, as measured here by the ability of the system to overcome a
moral hazard problem that limits the amount of income which borrowers can pledge to lenders,
can influence a country’s trade patterns and capital movements. Our main result has been to
demonstrate that there are circumstances under which entrepreneurial migration can make a
contribution to global efficiency, even when goods markets are fully integrated and there is
international capital market integration through borrowing, lending and foreign direct
investment.
In doing this we confirmed the presumption that countries with stronger institutions
export the output of financially dependent sectors, and that this comparative advantage tends
to be strengthened by any capital movements. We also confirmed that capital tends to move to
the country with the stronger institutions and that FDI motivated by differences in property
rights flowed in the same direction as the financial capital.
When we added entrepreneurial migration, we found that it too flowed towards the
country with the stronger institutions. Given its ‘residual’ role in our analysis, the
entrepreneurial migration was restricted to what we might call ‘career-changing’ migrants -
agents who do not meet the higher entrepreneurial threshold in the country with the weaker
institutions, but who do satisfy the lower threshold in the country with the stronger
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institutions.25 If the costs of FDI were sufficiently high, some agents who meet the criteria to
borrow in both markets might also choose the migration option. Entrepreneurial migration and
FDI were found to be substitutes. Some migrants would otherwise have undertaken FDI.
Entrepreneurial migration also crowds out some domestic entrepreneurs.
Although the combination of all three forms of capital mobility eventually fully
integrated the capital market and removed any distortions due to the weak institutions in one
country, this did not occur through the bypass channels (financial capital outflow and FDI
inflow in the country with the weaker institutions) highlighted in Ju and Wei (2010). 26
Moreover, the complete removal of distortions would not hold had we assumed that both
countries were financially constrained (POSE) under autarky.
We have employed a very simple model with familiar features that allowed us to obtain
our results quite straightforwardly. There are numerous features that could be added. A
potentially fruitful possibility for future research would be to introduce financial intermediaries.
In our model all borrowing and lending takes place in capital markets.27 This is not very
realistic, especially for developing economies, as a great part of financial transactions are
intermediated. The introduction of financial intermediaries would allow us to examine the
behavior of the spread between borrowing and lending rates which itself is a measure of
financial development. The idea here is that a more efficient banking system offers higher
returns on lending and lowers borrowing costs. In addition, they extend credit to agents that
otherwise would have been unable to finance their projects. We would therefore expect the
quality of the banking system to be another factor influencing trade patterns and the direction
and volume of capital and entrepreneurial migration flows.
25In some instances, these agents may not qualify as entrepreneurial migrants. Because of concerns about bogus
migrants, many entrepreneurial migration schemes have initial-entry requirements that potential migrants
demonstrate their entrepreneurial ability and/or their capacity to attract funds (e.g. from venture capitalists or
financial institutions which are also likely to look for experience and demonstrated success). While existing active
entrepreneurs should have few difficulties in this respect, career-changing migrants have no such-experience and
may therefore be ineligible under some entrepreneurial visa schemes. See Sumption (2012) for details.
26 This can be attributed to the fact that in their model FDI is attracted by higher marginal productivity of capital
while in our model is driven by better protection of property rights. Moreover, in our two sector model the
internationally immobile factor can be employed outside the financially dependent sector, and in our case its
employment in that sector doesn’t require any capital at all. But in a standard, competitive one-sector model, some
capital must be employed along with the labor.
27 Our contractual structure is too simple to allow for a distinction between equity and bond markets. As Tirole
(2006) shows by allowing the technology return to be positive when the project fails the optimal financial
instrument becomes the standard debt contract.
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Figure 1: Autarky Equilibrium Possibilities
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Appendix: Production, Income and Trade Patterns.
A1: TCF-POSE Equilibrium
In each country PRI is produced by all agents below the corresponding threshold. In the home
country MAN is produced by all agents above the two thresholds. Eligible entrepreneurs in the
foreign country use FDI to produce in the home country. MAN is produced in the foreign
country using the safe technology, and this output is derived by subtracting capital outflows
(ܮூ∗) and FDI ([1 − ܣ௜∗]ܭ) from the foreign country’s aggregate endowment.
ݔ௜= ܣ௜= ܭ − ߛ and ݔ௜∗ = ܣ௜∗ = ܭ − [ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ] (A1)
ݕ௜= [1 − ܣ௜]ܴߣ + [1 − ܣ௜∗]ܴߣ and ݕ௜∗ = ଵଶ− ܮ௜∗ − [1 − ܣ௜∗]ܭ (A2)
The foreign threshold is higher than the home threshold, which implies that the FDI
entrepreneurs (firms) borrow less, on average, than home entrepreneurs. World output is given
by:
ܺ௜= 2ܭ − [ߛ+ ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ] (A3)
௜ܻ= ܴߣ ଵ௄ − ቄଵଶ௄ − ௅೔∗௄ − [1 − ܣ௜∗]ቅ[ܴߣ − ܭ] (A4)
where the second term on the RHS of (A4) represents the ‘shortage’ of foreign entrepreneurs
multiplied by the MAN output foregone (per investment) by using the safe technology rather
than the more efficient advanced technology in the home country.
The equilibrium world relative price is given by ௜ܲ= ௒೔௑೔. The home country will export
MAN if its (income) share of world MAN output exceeds its (income) share of world PRI
output ( ௜ܵ
௬ > ௜ܵ௫). Home income from MAN (ܫ௜) is equal to home MAN output less the interest
payments to foreign lenders. Foreign income from MAN (ܫ௜∗) is equal to the aggregate income
of its capital plus the income of its entrepreneurs (remember the interest rate is equal to the
return of the safe technology which is equal to one).
ܫ௜= [1 − ܣ௜]ܴߣ − ܮ௜∗ (A5)
ܫ௜
∗ = ଵ
ଶ
+ [1 − ܣ௜∗][ܴߣ − ܭ] (A6)
Considering the home income shares, we have ௜ܵ
௬ = ூ೔
ூ೔ାூ೔
∗ and ௜ܵ௫ = [௄ିఊ][௄ିఊା௄ିఊ∗ି∆ఒ]. Thus,
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௜ܵ
௬
− ௜ܵ
௫ = [௄ି(ఊ∗ା∆ఒ)]ூ೔ି [௄ିఊ]ூ೔∗
ூൣ೔ାூ೔
∗൧[ଶ௄ି[ఊାఊ∗ା∆ఒ]] > 0 (A7)
since ߛ> ߛ∗ + ∆ߣ and ܫ௜> ܫ௜∗ . So besides the large outflows of MAN output on service
account, the home country is a net exporter of MAN and importer of PRI output.
A2: TCF-COSE Equilibrium
Output for each good in each country is given by:
ݔ௜= ߜ− ௅೔∗௄ , ݔ௜∗ = ߜ+ ௅೔∗௄ and ܺ௜= 2ߜ (A8)
ݕ௜= ܴߣ ଵ௄ , ݕ௜∗ = 0 and ௜ܻ= ܴߣ ଵ௄ (A9)
The MAN incomes are now:
ܫ௜= ܴߣ ଵଶ௄ + ௅೔∗௄ [ܴߣ − ݎ௜ܭ] (A10)
ܫ௜
∗ = ܴߣ ଵ
ଶ௄
−
௅೔
∗
௄
[ܴߣ − ݎ௜ܭ] (A11)
Comparing the home income shares we get
௜ܵ
௬
− ௜ܵ
௫ = ூ೔௫೔∗ିூ೔∗௫೔
௒೔௑೔
> 0 (A12)
since ݔ௜∗ > ݔ௜from (A8) and ܫ௜> ܫ௜∗ from (A10) and (A11). The home country is a net exporter
of MAN and importer of PRI output.
A3: TCF-COSE and TCFE-COSE Equilibrium
The home MAN income is composed of the output of the home firms plus the output of the
entrepreneurial migrants minus the interest payments on borrowed capital.
ܫ௘=ܴߣ
ଵ
ଶ௄
+ ௘݊∗ܴߣ − ݎ௘ܮ௘∗ = ܴߣ ଵଶ௄ + ௘݊∗[ܴߣ − ݎ௘ ௘݈∗]> ܴߣ ଵ
ଶ௄
+ ௅೔∗
௄
[ܴߣ − ݎ௜ܭ] = ܫ௜28 (A13)
The foreign MAN income is composed of the output of the foreign FDI firms plus the interest
income on loans to the home country
28 From (21) and (18) ௘݊
∗ = ∆஻
௥೐
= ∆஻[௄ିఋ]
ఊ
> ∆஻[௄ିఋ]
ఊାఊ∗ା∆ఒ
= ௅೔∗
௄
, and ݎ௘ ௘݈∗ = ଶఊି∆஻ଶ < ଶఊି∆஻ଶ ௄ିఋ௄ = ݎ௜ܭ.
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ܫ௘
∗=ܴߣ ቂଵ
ଶ௄
− ௘݊
∗ቃ+ ݎ௘ܮ௘∗ = ܴߣ ଵଶ௄ − ௘݊∗[ܴߣ − ݎ௘ ௘݈∗] < ܫ௘ (A14)
since ܫ௘ + ܫ௘∗ = ܫ௜+ ܫ௜∗, ܫ௘ > ܫ௜ implies ܫ௘∗ < ܫ௜∗. Then
௘ܵ
௬ = ூ೐
௒೐
and ௘ܵ௫ = ఋଶఋ and ௘ܵ௬ − ௘ܵ௫ = ௡೐∗ఒோି௥೐௅೐∗௒೐ > 0 (A15)
The home country remains an exporter of MAN, because it has had an inflow of factors specific
to MAN output. While we have shown in the text that entrepreneurial migration (partially)
substitutes for FDI, there are no clear substitutability or complementarity relationships between
entrepreneurial migration and goods trade or international borrowing and lending. The home
country has a larger income share of both MAN and PRI compared to the TCF-COSE.29
Borrowing by the home country, which is equal in value to the borrowing by its immigrant
entrepreneurs, may be greater or less than its borrowing in the TCF-COSE.30
A4: TCF-POSE and TCFE-COSE Equilibrium
Home (including migrant) MAN income increases
ܫ௘− ܫ௜= ௘݊∗[ܴߣ − ݎ௘ ௘݈∗] − ௅೔∗௄ [ܴߣ − ܭ] > 0 (A16)
since ௘݊∗ > ௅೔∗௄ and ܭ > ݎ௘ ௘݈∗ in this range.31 But foreign MAN income could rise or fall.
ܫ௘
∗ − ܫ௜
∗ = ቄଵ
ଶ௄
− 1ൣ −ܣ݅
∗
൧ቅ[ܴߣ −ܭ]− ݁݊∗[ܴߣ − ݁ݎ ݈݁∗] (A17)
Once again there is no clear substitutability or complementarity relationship between
entrepreneurial migration and goods trade or international borrowing and lending.
29 We find using (27) and (A13) that ௘ܵ
௬
− ௜ܵ
௬ = ூ೐ିூ೔
௒೐௒೔
> 0 and ௘ܵ௫ = ఋଶఋ > ௫೔ଶఋ = ௜ܵ௫.
30 Since ௘݊∗ ௘݈∗ = ∆஻ఊ ቂ1 − ∆஻ଶఊቃ[ܭ − ߜ]ଶ and ௅೔∗௄ = ∆஻ଶఊି∆஻ [ܭ − ߜ], ݅ݏ݃݊ቄ௡೐∗௟೐∗ି௅೔∗௞ ቅ= ݅ݏ݃݊൜௄ିఋଶ௄ − 2ቂ ఊଶఊି∆஻ቃଶൠ, which
tends to be negative when ∆ܤ is small.
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௘݊
∗ −
௅೔
∗
௄
= [ܭ − ߜ] + ∆ܤ [௄ିఋ]
ఊ
− ߛ> [ܭ − ߜ] + ∆஻
ଶ
− ߛ> 0; and ݎ௘ ௘݈∗ = ߛ− ∆஻ଶ < ܭ − ߜ< ܭ .
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Table 1: A Sample of Entrepreneurial Migration Schemes
Country Programme Entry Requirements Criteria for Permanent Stay
Australia** Business innovation and
investment visa
(subclass 188)
Applicants must be State or Territory nominated, under 55
years of age, demonstrate $A800,000 business and personal
Assets and meet a points test
After 4 years employ 2 Australians and
asset requirements.
Canada
(Quebec Province)
Entrepreneur
programme
Assets of $C300,000+, business experience, submit a
business proposal or have acquired a business.
In 3 years create at least 1 job for
another Quebec resident
France** Entrepreneur Visa Long term non-speculative investment of €10million 10 year residency permit
Germany* Self-employment Visa Invest €250,000. Investment not mandatory if have a strong
business idea and have enough capital to start.
Create 5 jobs within 3 years
Ireland*** Startup Visa Raise €75,000 in startup capital for business deemed to have
"high potential" in export-oriented industries or fields
associated with innovation.
5 year renewable, no residency
required
Italy *** Startup Visa Have €50,000 in startup capital, submit innovative business
plan.
2 year renewable
New Zealand** Entrepreneur
work visa (introduced
24/03/2014)
Invest $100,000 in a NZ business; meet a points
Test; have business experience relevant to business proposal
2 years residence
Singapore** Global Investor
Programme
Invest $2.5million over 5 years; minimum of 3 years
substantial business experience in a business with sufficient
turnover
Direct to permanent
United
Kingdom***
Entrepreneur Visa. Have disposable funds depending on visa type; meet a
points test and English Requirement
After 5 years, residency and 10 FT jobs
United States** New Commercial
Enterprise and
EB5 Immigrant
visa
Invest $1 million (or $500,00 if invest in targeted
employment area)
After 2 years 10 FT jobs and involved in
management
Sources: *Table 1 in Sumption (2012). **Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection, Submission 14 to the Joint Standing Committee on
Migration Inquiry into the Business Innovation and Investment Programme, 2014. Appendix F. ***Migreat.com. http://blog.migreat.com/2014/07/22/start-
a-company-in-europe-the-10-best-visa-options-for-entrepreneurs-and-startups/accessed24/11/2014
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Appendix: (Not Intended for Publication)
Trade and Capital Mobility
We now consider international trade flows and international borrowing and lending between
two such economies. We deal with these transactions simultaneously because their effects are
familiar from the literature. The resulting equilibrium will provide a base from which we can
add FDI and then entrepreneurial migration. We assume the two countries have the same
distributions of wealth and population, but that the home country has superior institutions –
stronger property rights (ߣ> ߣ∗) and better corporate governance (ܤ∗ > ܤ), where foreign
country variables and parameters are denoted by *. We start from an autarky equilibrium where
one country is financially constrained and the other is not. Given that the distribution of asset
holdings is assumed to be the same in the two countries, the home country has more eligible
entrepreneurs at any common interest rate (see (12) below), so that if only one country is
financially constrained it must be the foreign country. Then from (2)
ܣ௙ = ܭ − ߛ< ܣ௙∗ = ܭ − ߛ∗ and ܣ௪ = ܣ௪∗ = ߜ (9)
An autarky equilibrium where the foreign country has a POSE and the home country a COSE
is possible as long as
1 − ܣ௙ > ଵଶ௄ > 1 − ܣ௙∗ or ߛ> ܭ − ߜ> ߛ∗ (10)
The first inequality implies the home country has a ‘surplus’ of eligible entrepreneurs when its
interest rate is unity, and hence the home country’s equilibrium interest rate under autarky
exceeds the lower bound (ݎ௔ > 1) to ration the investment opportunities. The second inequality
implies that the foreign country has a ‘shortage’ of eligible entrepreneurs even when its interest
rate is at its lower bound (ݎ௔∗ = 1). We illustrate the possible autarky outcomes in Figure 1.
Since we assume ߛ> ߛ∗, the relevant range is under the 45o line, and can be divided into three
areas. When both pledges are low (both < ܭ − ߜ), both countries are in a POSE; when both
pledges are high (both > ܭ − ߜ), both countries are in a COSE, and in the intermediate ranges(ߛ> ܭ − ߜ> ߛ∗) the home country has a COSE and the foreign a POSE.
Given K and the distribution of wealth, ܭ − ߜ(= ܭ − ܣ௪ ) measures the minimum pledge
necessary for there to be sufficient eligible entrepreneurs to employ all the available capital
under the advanced technology. From (4) we get
ݎ௔ = ఊ௄ିఋ > ݎ௔∗ = 1 (11)
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where to the right of the first equality sign we have the ratio of the maximum to the minimum
pledge.
International trade will equalise relative product prices (at ௖ܲ, say) and international
capital movements will equalise interest rates (at ݎ௖, say). From (1) we see that at the common
interest rate we have
ܣ௖
∗ − ܣ௖ = ଵ௥೎ {ߛ− ߛ∗} > 0 (12)
that is the home country has the lower threshold because of its more efficient institutions (its
higher pledge). Since trade alone does not affect interest rates in this model, 32 once
international borrowing and lending are possible capital will flow from the foreign to the home
country until both interest rates are equalised at ݎ௖≥ 1, with the inequality holding if the capital
outflow releases the foreign country from its financial constraint before the home interest rate
has fallen to unity. Let the amount lent by the foreign country be ܮ௖∗ . The new thresholds and
interest rate must satisfy
ܣ௖ = ܭ − ଵ௥೎ߛ and ܣ௖∗ = ܭ − ଵ௥೎ߛ∗ (13)
1 − ܣ௖ = ଵଶ௄ + ௅೎∗௄ and 1 − ܣ௖∗ ≤ ଵଶ௄ − ௅೎∗௄ (14)
The inequality in (14) holds if the equalised interest rate is unity, and we deal with this (TC-
POSE) equilibrium first.
3.1. TC-POSE Equilibrium
When ݎ௖ = 1, we can substitute (13) into (14) and solve for
ܣ௖ = ܭ − ߛ< ߜ= ܣ௔; ܣ௖∗ = ܭ − ߛ∗ = ܣ௔∗ (15)
௅೎
∗
௄
= ߛ− [ܭ − ߜ] ≤ [ܭ − ߜ] − ߛ∗ (16)
This TC-POSE equilibrium holds if 2[ܭ − ߜ] ≥ ߛ+ ߛ∗, i.e. if ଵ
௄
≥ ൣܭ − ܣ௙൧+ [ܭ − ܣ௙∗] so
that there are insufficient eligible entrepreneurs in both countries combined to employ all the
capital under the advanced technology, even when the equalised interest rate is unity.
32 In our model international trade has no effect on the interest rate because the marginal product of capital is
constant. In models where trade affects the marginal product of capital, as for example in Furusawa and Yanagawa
(2011), the interest rate will increase in the country with the higher quality financial institutions and decline in the
other country thus reinforcing the results of this model.
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This outcome is illustrated for point U in Figure 2. The capital movement
simultaneously relaxes the home wealth constraint and reduces the foreign entrepreneurial
shortage. The home minimum pledge increases with its capital inflow (i.e. the vertical
constraint moves to [ܭ − ߜ] + ௅೎∗
௄
) and the foreign minimum pledge falls due to its capital
outflow (the horizontal constraint falls to [ܭ − ߜ] − ௅೎∗
௄
). For a point such as U, the capital
movement reduces the home interest rate to unity before removing the foreign entrepreneurial
shortage and now both countries are in a POSE.
The capital inflow to the home country increases its number of active entrepreneurs,
which reduces PRI output and increases MAN output. The capital outflow from the foreign
country reduces its production of MAN using the safe technology, but in this case is insufficient
to eliminate its entrepreneurial shortage and hence has no effect on its entrepreneurial threshold
or PRI output. So:
ݔ௖ = ܣ௖ = ܭ − ߛ< ߜ= ݔ௔ and ݔ௖∗ = ܣ௖∗ = ܭ − ߛ∗ = ݔ௔∗ (17)
ܺ௖≡ ݔ௖ + ݔ௖∗ = 2ܭ − [ߛ+ ߛ∗] < ܺ௔ ≡ ݔ௔ + ݔ௔∗ (18)
ݕ௖ = ܴߣ [ ଵଶ௄ + ௅೎∗௄ ] > ܴߣ ଵଶ௄ = ݕ௔ and ݕ௖∗ = ݕ௔∗ − ܮ௖∗ < ݕ௔∗ (19)
௖ܻ = ଵଶ௄ [ܴߣ + ߣ∗ܴ] + ௅೎∗௄ [ܴߣ − ܭ] − ቄଵଶ௄ − [1 − ܣ௖∗]ቅ[ߣ∗ܴ − ܭ] > ௔ܻ (20)
The second term on the RHS of (20) represents the gain in output from employing ܮ௖∗ under the
advanced technology in the home country rather than the safe technology in the foreign country;
while the third term reflects the output forgone because there is still an entrepreneurial shortage
in the foreign country. Aggregate output of MAN increases because ܮ௖∗ is now employed using
the home advanced technology rather than the foreign safe technology.
The equilibrium world relative price is given by ෨ܲ௖ = ௒೎௑೎. The home country will export
MAN if its (income) share of world MAN output exceeds its (income) share of world PRI
output ( ௖ܵ
௬ > ௖ܵ௫).33 Home income from MAN (ܫ௖) is equal to home MAN output less the
interest payments to foreign lenders – i.e. ܫ௖ = ݕ௖− ܮ௖∗ . Foreign income from MAN (ܫ௖∗) is
foreign MAN output plus interest income – i.e. ܫ௖∗ = ݕ௖∗ + ܮ௖∗ = ݕ௔∗ . So ௖ܵ௬ = ௬೎ି௅೎∗௬೎ି௅೎∗ା௬ೌ∗ .
33 We assume that the interest income on foreign loans and income earned from FDI is remitted in units of MAN
the output that the capital/FDI produces. Once we take this repatriated income into account, it is the home income
share rather than its output share that determines the direction of trade in goods.
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Likewise from (17) and (18) the home share of PRI income is ௖ܵ௫ = [௄ିఊ][௄ିఊା௄ିఊ∗]. This then gives
us
௖ܵ
௬
− ௖ܵ
௫ = [௄ିఊ∗][௬೎ି௅೎∗ ]ି[௄ିఊ]௬ೌ∗
௒೎௑೎
> 0 (21)
since ߛ> ߛ∗ and using ݕ௖− ܮ௖∗ > ݕ௔∗ from (19). The capital importing home country exports
MAN and imports PRI.34 Our model thus replicates the standard trade pattern found in the
literature.35
3.2. TC-COSE Equilibrium
Where the capital outflow eliminates the foreign entrepreneurial shortage before the home
interest rate falls to unity, the TC-equilibrium is a COSE for both countries, and ݎ௖ > 1.
Making the same substitutions as above we obtain
ܭ − ߜ+ ௅೎∗
௄
= ఊ
௥೎
< ߛ (22)
ܭ − ߜ−
௅೎
∗
௄
= ఊ∗
௥೎
< ߛ∗ (23)
ܣ௖ = ߜ− ௅೎∗௄ < ߜ= ܣ௔ and ܣ௖∗ = ߜ+ ௅೎∗௄ > ܭ − ߛ∗ = ܣ௔∗ 36 (24)
௅೎
∗
௄
= ఊିఊ∗
ఊାఊ∗
[ܭ − ߜ] and ݎ௖ = ఊାఊ∗ଶ[௄ିఋ] > 1 where ݎ௔ = ఊ[௄ିఋ] > ݎ௖ (25)
The equilibrium solution corresponding to initial point V is shown by point Z in Figure 2.37
This time the capital outflow reduces the foreign minimum pledge to ߛ∗ (thereby eliminating
34 By considering trade and capital flows separately one can also show that the home country exports MAN when
only goods trade is possible and that trade and capital movements are complements in that the income share of
the home country in MAN increases and its PRI share declines, implying an increase in MAN exports, when we
add capital movements to trade. It is well known in competitive trade models, that trade flows and capital flows
are substitutes when comparative advantage arises because of differences in endowments. In contrast, when
comparative advantage arises because of differences in technologies, trade flows and capital flows are
complements. In our model, as in Antras and Caballero (2009) and Furusawa and Yanagawa (2011), when the
only difference between countries is the quality of institutions, trade flows and capital flows are complements,
implying that differences in the quality of the financial systems are equivalent to differences in technology.
Pledgeable income per investment is (ܴߣ − ܤ) and thus an improvement in technology (increase in ܴ) or an
improvement in the efficiency of institutions (increase in ߣor decrease in ܤ) have exactly the same effect on the
ability of the entrepreneur to raise external funds.
35 See footnote 9 for theoretical analyses and footnote 10 for empirical evidence.
36 Since ܣ௖∗ = ܭ − ఊ∗௥೎ > ܭ − ߛ∗ = ܣ௔∗ .
37 If we let z = ܭ − ߜ+ ௅೎∗
௄
and ݖ∗ = ܭ − ߜ− ௅೎∗
௄
, then taking the ratio of (22) to (23), we have ௭
∗
௭
= ఊ∗
ఊ
, so that the
solution must lie on ray OV. Further ݖ+ ݖ∗ = 2[ܭ − ߜ], so that the solution must also lie on ܥ∗ܥ. The intersection
of these two lines is point Z.
35
the foreign entrepreneurial shortage) before the capital inflow increases the home minimum
pledge to ߛ (thereby setting ݎ= 1). The capital flow then continues until interest rates are
equalised in the two markets.38
Relative to autarky, the home entrepreneurial threshold has fallen, indicating a
reduction in PRI output. The opposite has occurred in the foreign country. Using (24) we can
show that
ݔ௖ = ߜ− ௅೎∗௄ < ߜ= ݔ௔ and ݔ௖∗ = ߜ+ ௅೎∗௄ > ܭ − ߛ∗ = ݔ௔∗ (26)
But aggregate PRI output has fallen ( ܺ௖ = 2ߜ< ܺ௔). Home MAN output increases due to the
capital inflow and induced reduction in its entrepreneurial threshold. Foreign MAN output falls,
due to its capital outflow and increased entrepreneurial threshold. Aggregate MAN output
increases because of the (partial) reallocation of capital to more efficient home producers. Let
∆ߣ≡ [ߣ− ߣ∗]ܴ measure the (expected) gain in output from being subject to the home rather
than the foreign property rights regime, then
ݕ௖ = ܴߣ [ ଵଶ௄ + ௅೎∗௄ ] > ݕ௔ and ݕ௖∗ = ߣ∗ܴ[ ଵଶ௄ − ௅೎∗௄ ] = ଵଶ− ܮ௖∗ + [1 − ܣ௖∗][ߣ∗ܴ − ܭ] < ݕ௔∗
Aggregate output ௖ܻ = ଵଶ௄ [ܴߣ + ߣ∗ܴ] + ௅೎∗௄ ∆ߣhas increased as
௖ܻ− ௔ܻ = ൜ଵଶ௄ − {1 − ܣ௔∗ }ൠ[ߣ∗ܴ − ܭ] + ௅೎∗௄ ∆ߣ> 0
To determine the direction of trade, we note that
ܫ௖ = ݕ௖− ݎ௖ܮ௖∗ = ܴߣ ଵଶ௄ + ௅೎∗௄ [ܴߣ − ݎ௖ܭ] and (27)
ܫ௖
∗ = ݕ௖∗ + ݎ௖ܮ௖∗ = ߣ∗ܴ ଵଶ௄ − ௅೎∗௄ [ߣ∗ܴ− ݎ௖ܭ] (28)
If we compare the home country’s income share of MAN relative to PRI, we find that
௖ܵ
௬
− ௖ܵ
௫ = ூ೎௫೎∗ି௫೎ூ೎∗
௒೎௑೎
> 0 (29)
Since ܫ௖ > ܫ௖∗ from (28) and ݔ௖∗ > ݔ௖ from (26). So the capital-importing country also exports
MAN in the TC-COSE equilibrium.
38 The interest rate has adjusted to remove any surplus entrepreneurs in the combined markets. Note that ݎ௖− 1 =
ఊାఊ∗ିଶ[ܭ−ߜ]2[ܭ−ߜ] , the proportional excess supply of entrepreneurs at a unitary interest rate.
